Events in East Asia, stakes and realities

Meaning in the region’s mishmash

In decoding the latest events in East Asia, it is important to know the stakes and the realities.

DAILY news reports span events with their highs, lows and in-betweens. As a whole, they suggest a world of randomly unconnected currents and irrationally contradictory events with insubstantial or unpredictable outcomes.

There may be times when the planet is like that, but most of the time it may look that way while being something else again. If not exactly a method in the madness, there is usually meaning in the mishmash.

That is why policymakers and their advisers have their work to do, acting proactively or retroactively. For sleuths, it is important to expose conspiracies without necessarily resorting to conspiracy theories.

In recent days alone, global society learned that Miss China won the Miss World contest in Ordos, Inner Mongolia. This was the second time that a Miss China won, and the fact that it happened in front of a home crowd made it that much more special.

Meanwhile at the intergovernmental level, China and the US established a Sino-US Partnership on Smoke-free Workplaces to restrict smoking and its consequences in public and private sector workplaces. Several such agreements involving governments and NGOs have emerged between China and the US in recent years.

In economics, much more continue to happen between East Asia and the rest of the world, spurred particularly by China’s spectacular growth profile. Despite ideological differences and occasional bumps over specific trade, investment or currency issues, the Chinese and US economies have never been more closely linked or interdependent, and increasingly so.

Periodic spats continue between countries across national borders, sometimes over where those borders should be. While they gain wider attention with diplomatic forays or military missions, in involving social, economic and political dimensions, these disputes become far more intractable.

The latest dispute to flare again over the week has been rival claims over the Pinnacle Islands in the East China Sea, which Japan calls the Senkaku, China calls the Diaoyu and Taiwan calls the Diaoyutai.

Earlier this month, a group of Japanese lawmakers and right-wing NGO members had planned a trip to the islands to reaffirm Japanese sovereignty as well as to commemorate Japanese victims of the Second World War. This followed spats between China and the Philippines, and Vietnam, earlier in the year over rival claims to other islands in the South China Sea.

Japan had already been administering the Pinnacles with its presence. The government of Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda felt the nationalists’ trip would be unduly provocative and tried to stop it, earning the rebuke of nationalist groups and the right-wing mayor of Tokyo.

In the event, some 150 Japanese activists aboard 20 boats landed in the Pinnacles last Sunday. By then, Chinese activists from the Hong Kong-based Action Committee for Defending the Diaoyu Islands had landed on the Pinnacles’ biggest island four days before.

The activists were detained by Japanese authorities, who had earlier failed to dissuade them with water cannons and ramming their boat, Kai Fung No. 2. As Chinese protesters insisted on the activists’ release and Japanese nationalists demanded their imprisonment, Japan deported them.

Earlier in January, Hong Kong authorities had refused Kai Fung No. 2 permission to leave port “because the Marine Department had grounds to believe that the vessel would not be used for fishing and fishing-related purposes”. The boat’s owner is a known Chinese nationalist activist.

But during the week, Chinese activists on board the boat returned to Hong Kong to a public hero’s welcome. The governments in Beijing and Taipei protested when Japan detained the activists, but once they were freed, the general public in China and Taiwan took over the spotlight.

The governments involved wanted to show a measure of restraint without halting such activism altogether. It helps to keep popular support for official claims alive, without allowing it to overwhelm official policy or relations.

The Chinese activists had planted the flags of both China and Taiwan, symbolising a unity of the claims by the “two Chinas”. While previously both claims were handled separately by their respective governments, they lately appear to merge in relation to other countries.

The common misperception remains that Chinese communism is an evil that compounds differences with other countries. That classic ideological posture from the Cold War ill serves anyone in the present era.

As communist ideology wanes and the Chinese Communist Party’s grip nationwide recedes, the only framework that Beijing can access to mitigate the country’s multiple challenges is nationalism. And on the other side of the Taiwan Straits, the Kuomintang party in government is defined by Chinese nationalism.

If and when single party rule on the mainland ceases, a much more nationalist government is likely to emerge. A party in such a government would be more amenable to popular nationalist sentiment, while also less inclined to limit nationalist activism, creating new challenges for other countries.

China already has to confront multiple rival claims over territory with other countries. It behoves Chinese policymakers to minimise and streamline the issues for easier handling, such as by neutralising the dispute over sovereignty between Beijing and Taipei.

Until recent years, the Taiwan Straits and the South China Sea had been persistent flashpoints in East Asia. Now that cross-straits relations have improved, disputes in the South China Sea simmer while East China Sea territory is being contested again.

There is an apparent trade-off in flashpoint potential between sub-regions. China’s immediate neighbours have at the same time contributed to friction in the adjoining waters.

Two weeks ago, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak visited the Dokdo islands occupied by his country but which are also claimed by Japan. While there, Lee declared that the Japanese Emperor had to apologise to Koreans for Japan’s wartime misconduct before he could visit South Korea.

The Japanese Foreign Minister replied by calling South Korea’s presence in Dokdo an “illegal occupation”. The spat continued for weeks, with Seoul filing a formal protest against Tokyo two days ago.

However dramatic, these disputes are unlikely to cause a major conflagration. While China always looms larger because of size and potential, there are also opportunities amid the risks.

China’s historic transition is led by econo­mics, but not without social and political ramifications. One feature here is the transformation of the foreign policymaking elite.

Maoist China’s policymakers in the Foreign Ministry had long been typical party ideologues. But as its economy blossomed, a new array of inputs have come to constitute an elite sourced from both the private and government sectors.

Meanwhile, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has still been less amenable to change. It is still constitutionally required to serve in the defence of the nation without interfering politically, but there is a growing temptation to signal its political positions.

So far the party and the state have mitigated this by allocating bigger budgets for defence, while also keeping PLA pressure on policymaking at bay. A party or government more vulnerable to populist pressure or lobbying may have to give the military more leeway.

The challenge for other countries is to work constructively with the more progressive elements in China’s political establishment towards more agreeable foreign relations. But from some of the latest events in the region, that challenge may be very difficult to meet.

Behind The Headlines By Bunn Nagara

Related posts:
Japanese right-wingers seek political gains landed on Diaoyu Islands
China demands Japan release Chinese activists landed ... 
China, S.Korea demand Japan own up to its wars ...

Japan, the deputy sheriff in Asia? 

Who owns the South China Sea islets in the eyes of the ...  

Restoring unity at South China Sea

Events in East Asia, stakes and realities

Meaning in the region’s mishmash

In decoding the latest events in East Asia, it is important to know the stakes and the realities.

DAILY news reports span events with their highs, lows and in-betweens. As a whole, they suggest a world of randomly unconnected currents and irrationally contradictory events with insubstantial or unpredictable outcomes.

There may be times when the planet is like that, but most of the time it may look that way while being something else again. If not exactly a method in the madness, there is usually meaning in the mishmash.

That is why policymakers and their advisers have their work to do, acting proactively or retroactively. For sleuths, it is important to expose conspiracies without necessarily resorting to conspiracy theories.

In recent days alone, global society learned that Miss China won the Miss World contest in Ordos, Inner Mongolia. This was the second time that a Miss China won, and the fact that it happened in front of a home crowd made it that much more special.

Meanwhile at the intergovernmental level, China and the US established a Sino-US Partnership on Smoke-free Workplaces to restrict smoking and its consequences in public and private sector workplaces. Several such agreements involving governments and NGOs have emerged between China and the US in recent years.

In economics, much more continue to happen between East Asia and the rest of the world, spurred particularly by China’s spectacular growth profile. Despite ideological differences and occasional bumps over specific trade, investment or currency issues, the Chinese and US economies have never been more closely linked or interdependent, and increasingly so.

Periodic spats continue between countries across national borders, sometimes over where those borders should be. While they gain wider attention with diplomatic forays or military missions, in involving social, economic and political dimensions, these disputes become far more intractable.

The latest dispute to flare again over the week has been rival claims over the Pinnacle Islands in the East China Sea, which Japan calls the Senkaku, China calls the Diaoyu and Taiwan calls the Diaoyutai.

Earlier this month, a group of Japanese lawmakers and right-wing NGO members had planned a trip to the islands to reaffirm Japanese sovereignty as well as to commemorate Japanese victims of the Second World War. This followed spats between China and the Philippines, and Vietnam, earlier in the year over rival claims to other islands in the South China Sea.

Japan had already been administering the Pinnacles with its presence. The government of Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda felt the nationalists’ trip would be unduly provocative and tried to stop it, earning the rebuke of nationalist groups and the right-wing mayor of Tokyo.

In the event, some 150 Japanese activists aboard 20 boats landed in the Pinnacles last Sunday. By then, Chinese activists from the Hong Kong-based Action Committee for Defending the Diaoyu Islands had landed on the Pinnacles’ biggest island four days before.

The activists were detained by Japanese authorities, who had earlier failed to dissuade them with water cannons and ramming their boat, Kai Fung No. 2. As Chinese protesters insisted on the activists’ release and Japanese nationalists demanded their imprisonment, Japan deported them.

Earlier in January, Hong Kong authorities had refused Kai Fung No. 2 permission to leave port “because the Marine Department had grounds to believe that the vessel would not be used for fishing and fishing-related purposes”. The boat’s owner is a known Chinese nationalist activist.

But during the week, Chinese activists on board the boat returned to Hong Kong to a public hero’s welcome. The governments in Beijing and Taipei protested when Japan detained the activists, but once they were freed, the general public in China and Taiwan took over the spotlight.

The governments involved wanted to show a measure of restraint without halting such activism altogether. It helps to keep popular support for official claims alive, without allowing it to overwhelm official policy or relations.

The Chinese activists had planted the flags of both China and Taiwan, symbolising a unity of the claims by the “two Chinas”. While previously both claims were handled separately by their respective governments, they lately appear to merge in relation to other countries.

The common misperception remains that Chinese communism is an evil that compounds differences with other countries. That classic ideological posture from the Cold War ill serves anyone in the present era.

As communist ideology wanes and the Chinese Communist Party’s grip nationwide recedes, the only framework that Beijing can access to mitigate the country’s multiple challenges is nationalism. And on the other side of the Taiwan Straits, the Kuomintang party in government is defined by Chinese nationalism.

If and when single party rule on the mainland ceases, a much more nationalist government is likely to emerge. A party in such a government would be more amenable to popular nationalist sentiment, while also less inclined to limit nationalist activism, creating new challenges for other countries.

China already has to confront multiple rival claims over territory with other countries. It behoves Chinese policymakers to minimise and streamline the issues for easier handling, such as by neutralising the dispute over sovereignty between Beijing and Taipei.

Until recent years, the Taiwan Straits and the South China Sea had been persistent flashpoints in East Asia. Now that cross-straits relations have improved, disputes in the South China Sea simmer while East China Sea territory is being contested again.

There is an apparent trade-off in flashpoint potential between sub-regions. China’s immediate neighbours have at the same time contributed to friction in the adjoining waters.

Two weeks ago, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak visited the Dokdo islands occupied by his country but which are also claimed by Japan. While there, Lee declared that the Japanese Emperor had to apologise to Koreans for Japan’s wartime misconduct before he could visit South Korea.

The Japanese Foreign Minister replied by calling South Korea’s presence in Dokdo an “illegal occupation”. The spat continued for weeks, with Seoul filing a formal protest against Tokyo two days ago.

However dramatic, these disputes are unlikely to cause a major conflagration. While China always looms larger because of size and potential, there are also opportunities amid the risks.

China’s historic transition is led by econo­mics, but not without social and political ramifications. One feature here is the transformation of the foreign policymaking elite.

Maoist China’s policymakers in the Foreign Ministry had long been typical party ideologues. But as its economy blossomed, a new array of inputs have come to constitute an elite sourced from both the private and government sectors.

Meanwhile, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has still been less amenable to change. It is still constitutionally required to serve in the defence of the nation without interfering politically, but there is a growing temptation to signal its political positions.

So far the party and the state have mitigated this by allocating bigger budgets for defence, while also keeping PLA pressure on policymaking at bay. A party or government more vulnerable to populist pressure or lobbying may have to give the military more leeway.

The challenge for other countries is to work constructively with the more progressive elements in China’s political establishment towards more agreeable foreign relations. But from some of the latest events in the region, that challenge may be very difficult to meet.

Behind The Headlines By Bunn Nagara

Related posts:
Japanese right-wingers seek political gains landed on Diaoyu Islands
China demands Japan release Chinese activists landed ... 
China, S.Korea demand Japan own up to its wars ...

Japan, the deputy sheriff in Asia? 

Who owns the South China Sea islets in the eyes of the ...  

Restoring unity at South China Sea

China demands Japan release Chinese activists landed on the Chinese-owned Diaoyu Islands

By James Pomfret and Linda Sieg
HONG KONG/TOKYO | Wed Aug 15, 2012 11:52am EDT

(Reuters) - China demanded Japan immediately and unconditionally free 14 Chinese activists held over a protest landing on disputed islands on Wednesday, as tensions between Tokyo and its neighbors flared on the anniversary of the end of World War Two.



 Video:Review: Diaoyu Islands dispute CCTV News - CNTV English
Video: Japan arrests 14 Chinese activists on Diaoyu Islands issue CCTV News - CNTV English

The landing by the activists on an island chain in the East China Sea and their detention by Japan's coastguard came on a day of regional diplomatic jousting, underscoring how history dogs Japan's ties with China and South Korea.

In a meeting with Japan's ambassador to Beijing and a phone call with a Japanese official, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Fu Ying lodged "solemn representations" over the latest territorial quarrel between Asia's two biggest economies.

Fu "demanded that Japan ensure the safety of 14 Chinese nationals and immediately and unconditionally release them", the Chinese Foreign Ministry said on its website.

Japan arrested five members of a group of activists from China, Hong Kong and Macau who landed on the island, Japan's coastguard said. China's Xinhua news agency said Japan's coastguard later detained nine activists on their boat. Japanese media also said that in all, 14 activists had been detained.

Earlier, South Korea prompted an official protest from Japan after comments by South Korean President Lee Myung-bak which some saw as going too far by insulting Japanese Emperor Akihito.

And in a move likely to add to the anger of Japan's neighbors, two Japanese cabinet ministers paid homage at a controversial Tokyo shrine for the war dead.

Memories of Japan's wartime occupation of much of China and colonization of South Korea run deep despite close economic ties in one of the world's wealthiest regions.

Japan protested to China's ambassador over the landing and Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda said Tokyo would deal with the matter strictly in accordance with the law.

Xinhua said Japan had pushed tension "to a new high".

"The tensions are fully due to irresponsible clamoring and attempts by some Japanese politicians and activists to claim the islands, which ... indisputably belong to China," it said.

Friction over the uninhabited isles, near potentially rich gas deposits, had been heating up already.

Several of the activists, who set out from Hong Kong, jumped into the sea, swam and waded ashore. The group said its boat had been rammed by the coastguard and hit with water cannon. A Japanese official denied that any serious damage had been done to the boat.

Media published photographs of the activists planting a Chinese flag on a rocky shore.

"We've waited 10 years for this... We finally managed to get ashore," the captain of the protest ship was quoted as saying on Hong Kong television.

A separate row over rival claims by South Korea and Japan to other islands has also intensified, signaling how the region has failed to resolve differences nearly seven decades after Japan's defeat at the end of World War Two.

WARTIME MEMORIES LINGER

The friction in part reflect skepticism over the sincerity of Japan's apologies for wartime and colonial excesses.

On Tuesday, South Korea's Lee told a group of teachers that Emperor Akihito should apologize sincerely if he wants to visit South Korea, saying a repeat of his 1990 expression of "deepest regrets" would not suffice.

Japan, noting that it had never broached the idea of a visit by the emperor to South Korea, lodged a protest with Seoul over the remarks. Akihito has spent much of the past two decades trying to heal the wounds of a war waged in his father's name.

Lee, whose Friday visit to the islands claimed by South Korea and Japan frayed ties between the two U.S. allies, called Japan an "important partner that we should work with to open the future".

But in remarks commemorating Korea's liberation from Japan's 1910-1945 rule, he also said the countries' tangled history was "hampering the common march toward a better tomorrow".

He urged Japan to do more to resolve a dispute over compensation for Korean women abducted to serve as sex slaves for wartime Japanese soldiers, known by the euphemism "comfort women" in Japan and long a source of friction.

"It was a breach of women's rights committed during wartime as well as a violation of universal human rights and historic justice. We urge the Japanese government to take responsible measures in this regard," Lee said.

Japan says the matter was closed under a 1965 treaty establishing diplomatic ties. In 1993, Tokyo issued a statement in the name of its then-chief cabinet secretary apologizing to the women and two years later set up a fund to make payments to the women. South Korea says those moves were not official and so not enough.

Speaking at a ceremony marking the war's end on Wednesday, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda acknowledged the "enormous damage and suffering" caused by Japan to other countries, especially in Asia.

"We deeply reflect upon (that) and express our deepest condolences to the victims and their families," he said, vowing that Japan would never go to war again.

Tapping into anti-Japanese sentiment remains a way to seek public support in South Korea and China, which face leadership changes in coming months. And some experts say a new strain of nationalism is surfacing in Japan amid gloom about the future.

In a sign of the domestic pressures in Japan, National Public Safety Commission Chairman Jin Matsubara and Transport Minister Yuichiro Hata visited the Yasukuni shrine for war dead, defying Noda's urgings to stay away.

Many see the shrine as a symbol of Japan's past militarism because 14 Japanese wartime leaders convicted as war criminals by an Allied tribunal are honored there with Japan's war dead.

(Additional reporting by Kaori Kaneko and Stanley White in Tokyo, and Ben Blanchard and Chris Buckley in Beijing; Editing by Louise Ireland and Robert Birsel)

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Backgrounder: History proves Diaoyu Islands are China's territory

Xinhua | 2012-8-17 19:02:23

The Japanese government on Friday decided to release the 14 Chinese illegally detained Wednesday by Japanese authorities at the Diaoyu Islands after the Chinese government repeatedly demanded their "immediate and unconditional" release.

The 14 Chinese, despite obstruction by Japan Coast Guard patrol ships, arrived at the Diaoyu Islands by a Hong Kong fishing vessel to assert China's territorial claim to the islands.

Japanese police arrested them on suspicion of "illegal entry."

After their detention, China's Vice Foreign Minister Fu Ying reiterated China's sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands and the affiliated islets, and demanded that the Japanese guarantee the safety of the citizens and free them immediately and unconditionally. On Thursday, China once again urged Japan to "immediately and unconditionally" release its nationals.

Demonstrators across China staged protests Thursday demanding the release of the 14 Chinese nationals.

The Diaoyu islands, in the East China Sea between China and Japan, have belonged to China since ancient times.

The islands are 120 nautical miles northeast of China's Taiwan province, 200 nautical miles east of China's mainland and 200 nautical miles west to Japan's southernmost island Okinawa.

Geologically the islands are attached to Taiwan. The waters around the islands are 100 to 150 meters deep and there is a 2,000-meter-deep oceanic trench between the islands and Japan's Okinawa islands.

Fishermen from China's Taiwan and Fujian and other provinces conducted activities such as fishing and collecting herbs in this area since ancient times.

The islands appeared on China's map since the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644).

There are records about the islands in a book published during the rule of Yong Le (1403 to 1424) in the Ming Dynasty, more than 400 years before Japan claimed discovery of the Diaoyu islands in 1884.

After the Ming Dynasty, the islands were recorded in many historical documents.

On a map published by Japan between 1783 and 1785, marking the boundary of the Ryukyu Kingdom, the Diaoyu islands were shown as belonging to China.

Japan never questioned China's sovereignty over the islands before the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1895.

In April 1895, the government of the Qing Dynasty was forced to sign the Treaty of Shimonoseki, under which China ceded the whole island of Taiwan and its surrounding islands including the Penghu Islands to Japan.

Only since then has Japan had its own name for the area where the Diaoyu islands are located. Before that, Japanese maps marked the islands by their Chinese names.

Japan was occupied by the United Sates after it was defeated in the Second World War.

In 1951, Japan and the United States illegally signed a treaty in San Francisco without the presence of China, which was one of the victor countries in the Second World War.

Although article two of the treaty said that Japan surrendered its claim over Taiwan and the Penghu islands, article three wrongly assigned the Diaoyu islands, which Japan had stolen from China, and other islands, to the Ryukyu zone which was under US control.

The then Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai lodged a strong protest and said the Chinese government would never recognize the San Francisco Treaty.

In a statement on territorial waters in 1958, the Chinese government said that Japan should return all the territory of the People's Republic of China including Taiwan and the islands around it to China.

Consequently, there is no room for argument that the Diaoyu islands have historically been a part of China's territory.

Related:
Japan, the deputy sheriff in Asia?
China, S.Korea demand Japan own up to its wars criminal past

Google gets the Baidu blues again after mapping losses

Chinese rival set to overtake Google Maps

Google looks like being beaten again in China, as Baidu leaps ahead in the mobile mapping space.

The text ads giant was still second in the Quarterly Survey of China's Mobile Map Client Market, but only just, according to Beijing-based Analysys International.

Chinese player Autonavi was the market leader by a long way, with 25.7 per cent, and Google Maps came in second with 17.5 per cent, but had Baidu breathing down its neck in third with a 17.3 per cent share.

The momentum is with the Chinese search firm too – Baidu Maps' market share rose from 13.6 per cent in Q1 to 17.3 per cent in Q2 while Google’s fell from 23.2 per cent. As a result, Baidu is predicted to supplant Google in the current quarter.

To add to Google’s woes, the analyst said local users were having problems updating their version of its mapping client, while Apple is set to drop Google Maps as a pre-install on the next version of iOS, with reports suggesting Cupertino is working with Autonavi now in the region.

“If the above problems are not solved quickly, it's hard for Google map to reverse the situation,” wrote Analysys International in a blog post.

Baidu and Google are of course old foes in the search space, where the home-grown firm routed its Californian rival after Google moved its search servers to Hong Kong in 2010 over censorship concerns.

Google's market share is now around 16 per cent while Baidu dominates with around 78 per cent.

The mobile map market in China is growing at a staggering pace, jumping 206 per cent year-on-year last quarter to 229 million accounts, according to Analysys International.

The analyst predicted it would be a key battle ground for the next phase of the mobile internet given that maps and associated apps are closely tied to up to a quarter of mobile advertising. ®

By Phil Muncaster 
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US threat: superpower gun barrels pivot east

As US election fever sizzles, pressure mounts to spread the militarist mindset deeper and wider.

African agenda: Clinton (right) visiting a clinic in a suburb of Cape Town. — Reuters

THE heavy-duty globetrotting of Hillary Clinton as US Secretary of State was bound to take in Africa sooner or later. Now it has done so with as much gusto and relish as a new colonial carve-up of the continent.

This was the “dark continent” before it was “discovered” by the white man, before the African could succumb to Western maladies from various illnesses to the “structural adjustments” imposed by Western-controlled multilateral lending agencies.

And Africa today is the continent that Washington sees China moving into. How could the world’s sole superpower let that go unchallenged, particularly when the moves come from the world’s fastest rising power?

China is seeking natural resources for its growth, scouring the earth from South America to Africa and anywhere else with potential. The US, coming from behind in Africa, wants to get even and then pip China at the post.

Just what that means in real policy terms, or how that can benefit US interests, would have to be determined later.

So Clinton goes to nine countries in 11 days, posing with Nelson Mandela in South Africa and holding hands around campfires and singing Kumbaya from Benin, Ghana, Kenya and Malawi to Nigeria, Senegal, South Sudan and Uganda.

All of it made for good diplomacy and even better feel-good US news copy. However, some analysts observe that the US just does not have the funds to fulfil its African pledges.

Predictably, Washington denied this was in competition with China over Africa. And like all such official denials, it was as good an unofficial confirmation as any.

Clinton’s African agenda was formally based on the White House white paper “US Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa” produced just weeks before. This policy document aims to strengthen democracy, boost growth, promote peace and security, and encourage development.

Clinton asserted that the US had had a long history in Africa (before China), and it had been there for all the right and good reasons. But whether China is in the picture or not, US policymakers have a problem in credibly claiming both altruism and a long history in Africa.

Such claims of early US engagements typically neglect mentioning the slave trade from the late 15th century. This notorious denial of human rights through massive human trafficking involved the kidnap of countless African men in their prime over centuries by Europeans who sold them to Americans, setting back African development for generations.

Abraham Lincoln reputedly fought a civil war to end slavery only in the 19th century. That showed how embedded slavery had become in the New World, requiring a civil war to abolish.

Yet even this stain on Western history was predated by several decades by Admiral Zheng He’s three voyages to Africa in the early 15th century. These were Chinese trading missions that came to barter goods, not to extract vital human resources in a criminal fashion.

Later, Ronald Reagan’s administration infamously did business with the international pariah state of apartheid South Africa, while branding Mandela a terrorist leader. When questioned, Reagan called it “constructive engagement” to excuse his collaboration with a racist Pretoria.

Other US experiences elsewhere in Africa resulted in gross corruption and denial of human rights. From Rwanda and Somalia through Zaire (Democratic Republic of Congo), Equatorial Guinea and Ethiopia to Egypt and Libya today, the positive gains are not as rosy as they have been advertised.

More lately, the Obama administration overturned 10 years of hard work internationally by abruptly dumping a global arms trade treaty at the United Nations. Both legal and illegal arms and munitions supplies have devastated the developing world, notably Africa, which continues to lose thousands of lives and more than US$18bil (RM56bil) a year through armed conflict.

Clinton’s asides on China’s African presence come amid general criticism of Beijing’s modus operandi when doing business in Africa. China stands accused of not placing conditions on its African hosts before proceeding to deal with them.

To those intent on demonising China, however, Beijing can never win: it will be condemned whatever it does or does not do. If China were to impose political conditions on business deals, those who now complain it is not doing so will again be the first to complain.

There is a historical record for reference: once, an ideologically rampant China offered inducements to factions in developing countries to support their domestic communist movements.

Beijing has wisely refrained from such preconditions. Should China still offer such inducements, if only to make its own Communist Party or government look good?

Would it really be better if China exerted pressure on its trading partners or investment destinations to do what it considers important for its own values and objectives? To do so would be China’s equivalent of imposing US conditions on the developing world.

Some countries have also been guilty of offering “aid programmes” that hire their nationals as expatriates in the country supposedly aided. In contrast, China is said to hire African nationals for work on infrastructure projects it builds in Africa.

This provides local employment, while the infrastructure once built will remain in those countries to produce a multiplier effect for development through improved transportation for trade, investment, tourism and the distribution of educational opportunities and healthcare facilities.

Unlike the US variety, Chinese aid, trade and investment come with no strings attached, no crippling IMF or World Bank conditions, no military industrial complex supplying weapons to one side or the other, and no promises or threats of destabilisation, subversion, invasion, occupation, war or “regime change”. And Western critics pick on Beijing for that.

African analysts cite these as reasons why Africans will welcome China’s presence more than a competing US presence. China’s business deals come without the extra baggage of self-righteous preachiness and ideologically loaded value judgments.

Like the rest of the Third World, Africa may want to get as much as possible from both China and the US. So, in practice, it will not be a question of one suitor or the other.

But if Africa on its own is such a compelling case for renewed US interest, with China not a factor at all as officially claimed, why did Washington take so long to get interested? US policymakers must know that the official narrative of a rising Africa is not quite accurate.

To a degree, the Obama-Clinton act over Africa has also resulted from Mitt Romney’s presidential challenge. A leading US specialist on China, Prof David Shambaugh, finds that the Romney campaign is building a foreign policy team based largely on George W. Bush advisers.

This team sees China as a “global competitor” over Africa, and which despite some diplomatic platitudes in the preface, is relying heavily on greater military power. Lethal fallout may yet land in other regions from a superpower tottering in West Asia through teetering in South Asia on the way to Obama’s “pivot” in East Asia.

US presidential campaigns traditionally focus on domestic issues, but China and Africa are now generating a buzz among Americans online. Obama may also win a second term, but Romney’s influence on the campaign trail and Republican pressure in Congress may yet set the tone for US-China relations to come, to impact inevitably on East Asia as a whole.

Behind The Headlines By Bunn Nagara The Star

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Chinese Tech Billionaire To Launch Next Xiaomi Smartphone

All will be revealed (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Chinese smartphone startup Xiaomi has confirmed that it will unveil its new model in Beijing on Aug. 16, a year after the launch of its debut MI-1. The Android-based phone has sold over 3 million units and put Xiaomi and its billionaire cofounder Lei Jun on the global smartphone map. A Xiaomi spokesman refused to discuss the phone’s features, telling FORBES that all would be revealed on Aug. 16. A report on Sohu.com last week claimed that the new phone would use a Qualcomm quad-core 1.5GHz chip with a 4.3″ display touchscreen. Interestingly, Xiaomi may be raising its price to RMB2,499 ($392), compared to RMB1,999 for the first-generation phone. Lei initially told reporters that he didn’t expect to make a profit from handset sales, but surging shipments upended that calculation and boosted Xiaomi’s valuation to $4 billion in a recent funding round. You can read my profile of Lei here.

In a research note, Brian White of Topeka Capital Markets notes that Xiaomi recorded $995 million in sales for 1H 2012 and that China’s smartphone market continues to post rapid growth.

During our travels to China, we have noticed a surge in the popularity of Xiaomi smartphones and already the Company is a top-five vendor at a leading service provider in the country. The Company’s smartphones seem to be especially popular with the younger crowd due to their cutting edge design with high- energy color patterns.

Photos of Xiaomi’s new phone’s eco-packaging, though not what’s inside the box, have been posted to Lei’s microblog. Lei is famous for Steve Jobs-style product presentations that play to his geek fans in China (and infuriate his detractors). He will be out to prove that Xiaomi hasn’t sat still over the last year but is building a better phone with an integrated software experience for users. However, a jump to RMB2,499 would be a bold step, as smartphone prices in China are heading the other way, i.e. cheaper and cheaper. Apple and Samsung occupy the top rungs of smartphone chic, where a high sticker price doesn’t deter avid buyers. Xiaomi wants to carve out a mid-tier position where its brand carries weight. Its new phone will be a crucial part of that strategy.

By Simon Montlake, Forbes Staff

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Restoring unity at South China Sea

I DON’T usually pay attention to Asean meetings as there are so many of them but the disappointing outcome of the recently concluded Asean Ministers Meeting (AMM) in Phnom Penh caught my attention.

The failure of the meeting to come up with a joint communiqué was striking even to casual observers.

The failure, the first in the bloc’s 45-year history, caused by disagreement among Asean members over the South China Sea dispute, was a worrying development that has cast doubts over its ability to speak in unison on this thorny issue.

The last thing Asean needs is to be caught in a turf war for superpowers in its own backyard.

The South China Sea, which is so crucial not only to the littoral states but to the international community at large, could well be that stage.

China has been seen by many as acting “assertively” in backing its claim of the sea and has been involved in several stand-offs with Vietnam and the Philippines, which have also reacted strongly against China in those situations.

I wonder if Malaysia, as a claimant state, should start thinking of having in place specific contingency plans to confront the kinds of situation that Vietnam and the Philippines have faced against China.

I know Malaysia enjoys close bilateral and people-to-people relations with China. Beijing has even described us as a “special friend”.

Despite this, let us be reminded that China also has deep relations with Vietnam and the Philippines.

It even has nearly inextricable economic and strategic relations with the United States, a potential adversary and with whom it has clashing interests in the sea.

I am not schooled in the fine art of international relations but I believe nations should not always think the best of others and must be prepared to face any eventuality.

In the context of the South China Sea, such eventualities should include facing potentially hostile and intrusive acts of our neighbours which can undermine our interests.

Any one of the claimant states can turn adversarial but I believe we have to pay special attention to China.

Its recent actions such as patrolling disputed waters and deploying a garrison at Sansha city to impose its jurisdiction all point towards Beijing’s readiness and resolve to assert its claims.

What would Malaysia do should we find the cables of our offshore exploration vessels cut by a Chinese vessel or if Chinese surveillance and patrol vessels appear in our Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), situations which Vietnam and the Philippines have faced?

I believe Malaysia should prepare contingency plans to face such situations. Merely reacting to developments in this high-stake theatre would not be good enough.

The tense situation underscores the need for a binding code to govern the behaviour of the claimants.
Such a code will compel them to settle their disputes through peaceful means and using international law.

While I noticed progress between Asean and China to come up with guidelines for the Declaration of Conduct in the sea between them, they still have a long way to go before they can agree on a Code of Conduct.

On the outcome of the AMM meeting in Phnom Penh and China’s refusal to discuss disputes multilaterally, I foresee a prolonged impasse. At the rate things are going, I don’t see China changing tangent of not wanting to discuss the dispute multilaterally.

The Code of Conduct that Asean and China are working to establish would not be efficient if it did not include all the claimants. In this regard, one wonders if it would make sense to include Taiwan, which is also a claimant in the sea, to be a party to such a code.

It would not make sense to ignore this claimant in the construct of a code to govern the conduct of claimant states. What set of conduct then would Taiwan be subjected to if the Code of Conduct is agreed only between Asean and China?

Besides ensuring that everyone plays by the same rules, bringing Taiwan into the fold could help yield fresh perspectives to the discourse on disputes at sea, which to me seems to be getting nowhere.

Taiwan has much to offer in areas such as marine scientific research, fishery management/conservation, environmental protection, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, and search and rescue.

The claimant and littoral states could tap into Taiwan’s expertise in these areas and promote cooperation, build confidence and avert further tension.

I hope my take on the subject would provide food for thought to claimant states and prompt them to set aside differences and work together towards peace.

I believe Malaysia as a claimant state should not only be steadfast in safeguarding its interests but should also show initiative to promote peace.

Malaysia can leverage its position as a founding member of Asean and as a friend to claimant states and the United States to be a voice of reason.

With the statesmanship skills of our diplomats we can help restore unity in Asean that was shaken in the aftermath of the AMM in Phnom Penh, restore confidence between Asean and China, and reassert Asean’s centrality in regional security matters.

SON OF THE SEA

Kuala Lumpur

China Pushes on the South China Sea, ASEAN Unity Collapses

Publication: China Brief Volume: 12 Issue: 15

August 3, 2012

By: Ian Storey

China and ASEAN Much Further Apart than the Smiles Suggest

For more than two decades Beijing has pursued a consistent policy in the South China Sea composed of two main elements: gradually strengthening the country’s territorial and jurisdictional claims while at the same time endeavoring to assure Southeast Asian countries of its peaceful intentions. Recent moves by China to bolster its maritime claims have brought the first element into sharp relief, while reassurances of benign intent have, however, been in short supply. Indeed, far from assuaging Southeast Asian concerns regarding its assertive behavior, China has fuelled them by brazenly exploiting divisions within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to further its own national interests.

China Hardens Its Stance

Commentaries in China’s state-run media analyzing the South China Sea issue have become markedly less conciliatory. Opinion pieces highlight several new themes in China’s official line. One theme is that China’s territory, sovereignty as well as its maritime rights and interests increasingly are being challenged by Southeast Asian nations and Japan in the South and East China Seas. China’s response, it is argued, should be to uphold its claims more vigorously, increase its military presence in contested waters, and, if necessary, be prepared to implement coercive measures against other countries. As one commentary notes “Cooperation must be in good faith, competition must be strong, and confrontation must be resolute” (Caixin, July 13).

Another theme is that, while China has shown restraint, countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam have been pursuing provocative and illegal actions in a bid to “plunder” maritime resources such as hydrocarbons and fisheries which China regards as its own (China Daily, July 30).

A third theme is that Manila and Hanoi continue to encourage U.S. “meddling” in the South China Sea and that the United States uses the dispute as a pretext to “pivot” its military forces toward Asia (Global Times, July 11). To reverse these negative trends, Chinese commentators have urged the government to adopt more resolute measures toward disputed territories and maritime boundaries. Nationalist sentiment, they argue, demands no less.

Recent measures undertaken by the Chinese authorities do indeed suggest a more hard-line position. Ominously, some of the initiatives have included a strong military element, presumably as a warning to the other claimants that China is ready to play hardball.

Perhaps the most noteworthy attempt by China to bolster its jurisdictional claims in the South China Sea was the raising of the administrative status of Sansha from county to prefecture level in June. Sansha originally was established in 2007 as an administrative mechanism to “govern” the Paracel Islands, Macclesfield Bank and the Spratly Islands. Sansha’s elevation was an immediate response to a law passed on June 21  by Vietnam’s national assembly, which reiterated Hanoi’s sovereignty claims to the Paracels and Spratlys. Both Vietnam and China protested the other’s move as a violation of their sovereignty (Bloomberg, June 21). Less than a month later, Sansha’s municipal authorities elected a mayor and three deputy mayors and China’s Central Military Commission authorized the establishment of a garrison for “managing the city’s national defense mobilization, military reserves and carrying out military operations (Xinhua, July 20).

Earlier, in late June, China’s Defense Ministry announced it had begun “combat ready” patrols in the Spratly Islands to “protect national sovereignty and [China’s] security development interests” (Reuters, June 28). Embarrassingly for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy, however, on July 13, one of its frigates ran aground on Half Moon Shoal, 70 miles west of the Philippine island of Palawan and within the Philippines 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The frigate was refloated within 24 hours, suggesting that other PLA Navy vessels were nearby when the incident occurred. These developments provide further evidence of the growing militarization of the dispute.

China also has moved to undercut the claims and commercial activities of the Philippines and Vietnam in the South China Sea in other ways.

In June, the state-run China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) invited foreign energy companies to bid for exploration rights in nine blocks in the South China Sea. The blocks lie completely within Vietnam’s EEZ and overlap with those offered for development to foreign energy corporations by state-owned PetroVietnam. Accordingly, Hanoi vigorously protested CNOOC’s tender (Bloomberg, June 27). More importantly the blocks are located at the edge of China’s nine-dash line map and seem to support the argument that Beijing interprets the dashes as representing the outermost limits of its “historic rights” in the South China Sea. Under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), however, coastal states are not entitled to “historic rights” on the high seas. It is therefore unlikely that any of the major energy giants will bid for CNOOC’s blocks—although smaller companies may do so if only to curry favor with Beijing with a view to landing more lucrative contracts down the road. If, however, exploration does move forward in any of the nine blocks, a clash between Vietnamese and Chinese coast guard vessels will become a very real possibility.

On the issue of ownership of Scarborough Shoal, scene of a tense standoff between Chinese and Philippines fishery protection vessels in May-June, China position remains uncompromising. At the annual ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Phnom Penh, Cambodia in July, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi restated China’s sovereignty claims to the shoal, rejected the notion that it was disputed and accused Manila of “making trouble” (Xinhua, July 13). According to the Philippine foreign ministry, Chinese trawlers―protected by Chinese paramilitary vessels—continue to fish in waters close to Scarborough Shoal in contravention of a bilateral accord whereby both sides agreed to withdraw their vessels [1].

Following the ARF, China kept up the pressure on the Philippines. In mid-July, it dispatched a flotilla of 30 fishing trawlers to the Spratlys escorted by the 3,000-ton fisheries administration vessel Yuzheng 310 (Xinhua, July 15). The trawlers collected coral and fished near Philippine-controlled Pag-asa Island and Chinese-controlled Mischief and Subi Reefs (Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 27). The Philippine authorities monitored the situation but took no action.

The Phnom Penh Debacle

In the past, after China has undertaken assertive actions in the South China Sea it has tried to calm Southeast Asia’s jangled nerves. At the series of ASEAN-led meetings in Phnom Penh in mid-July, however, Chinese officials offered virtually no reassurances to their Southeast Asian counterparts. Worse still, China seems to have utilized its influence with Cambodia to scupper attempts by ASEAN to address the problem, causing a breakdown in ASEAN unity.

In the final stages of the annual meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers (known as the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting or AMM), the Philippines and Vietnam wanted the final communiqué to reflect their serious concerns regarding the Scarborough Shoal incident and the CNOOC tender. They were supported by Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand who felt that ASEAN should speak with one voice. Cambodia—which holds the rotating chairmanship of ASEAN and has close political and economic ties with China— objected because, in the words of Foreign Minister Hor Namhong, “ASEAN cannot be used as a tribunal for bilateral disputes” (Straits Times, July 22). Attempts by Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa to reach a compromise on the wording were unsuccessful and for the first time in its 45-year history the AMM did not issue a final communiqué.

The fallout from the AMM was immediate and ugly. Natalegawa labelled ASEAN’s failure to reach agreement “irresponsible” and that the organization’s centrality in the building of the regional security architecture had been put at risk (Straits Times, July 16). Singapore’s Foreign Minister, K. Shanmugam described the fiasco as a “sever dent” in ASEAN’s credibility (Straits Times, July 14). Cambodia and the Philippines blamed the failure on each other. Cambodia was pilloried by the regional press for its lack of leadership and for putting its bilateral relationship with China before the overall interests of ASEAN. One analyst alleged  Cambodian officials had consulted with their Chinese counterparts during the final stages of talks to reach an agreement on the communiqué [2]. China’s Global Times characterized the outcome of the AMM as a victory for China, which does not think ASEAN is an appropriate venue to discuss the dispute, and a defeat for the Philippines and Vietnam (Global Times, July 16).

A few days after the AMM, Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono dispatched his foreign minister to five Southeast Asian capitals in an effort to restore ASEAN unity. Natalegawa’s shuttle diplomacy resulted in an ASEAN foreign minister’s statement of July 20 on “ASEAN’s Six-Point Principles on the South China Sea” [3]. The six points, however, broke no new ground and merely reaffirmed ASEAN’s bottom line consensus on the South China Sea. In response to the joint statement, China’s Foreign Ministry said it would work with ASEAN to implement the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DoC) (Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 21).

One of the six points calls for the early conclusion of a code of conduct (CoC) for the South China Sea, but the Phnom Penh debacle has made that target highly doubtful.

Although China agreed to discuss a CoC with ASEAN in November 2011, Beijing always has been lukewarm about such an agreement, preferring instead to focus on implementing the DoC. Undeterred, earlier this year ASEAN began drawing up guiding principles for a code and in June agreed on a set of “proposed elements.” While much of the document is standard boiler plate, there are two aspects worthy of attention.

The first is that ASEAN calls for a “comprehensive and durable” settlement of the dispute, a phrase that seems to repudiate Deng Xiaoping’s proposal that the parties should shelve their sovereignty claims and jointly develop maritime resources. Clearly, the four ASEAN claimants have rejected Deng’s formula as it would be tantamount to recognizing China’s “indisputable sovereignty” over the South China Sea atolls.

The second interesting aspect concerns mechanisms for resolving disputes arising from violations or interpretations of the proposed code. The document suggests that disputing parties turn to the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) or dispute resolution mechanisms in UNCLOS. Neither, however, would be of much utility. While the TAC does provide for a dispute resolution mechanism in the form of an ASEAN High Council, this clause has never been invoked due to the highly politicized nature of the High Council and the fact that it cannot issue binding rulings. Moreover, although China acceded to the TAC in 2003, Beijing almost certainly would oppose discussion of the South China Sea at the High Council because it would be outnumbered 10 to 1.

UNCLOS does provide for binding dispute resolution mechanisms, including the submission of disputes to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). China always has rejected a role for the ICJ in resolving the territorial disputes in the South China Sea and, in 2006, China exercised its right to opt out of ITLOS procedures concerning maritime boundary delimitation and military activities.

On July 9, Vice Foreign Minister Fu Ying had indicated to ASEAN foreign ministers that China was willing to start talks on a CoC in September. Two days later, however, as ASEAN wrangled over their final communiqué, Foreign Minister Yang seemed to rule this out when he stated discussions could only take place “when the time was ripe” (Straits Times, July 11). At present ASEAN and China are not scheduled to hold any meetings on the CoC, though officials currently are discussing joint cooperative projects under the DoC.

If and when the two sides do sit down to discuss the CoC, it is probable that Beijing will demand all reference to dispute resolution be removed on the grounds that the proposed code is designed to manage tensions only and that the dispute can only be resolved between China and each of the other claimants on a one-on-one basis. Taken together, these developments have dimmed seriously the prospect of China and ASEAN reaching agreement on a viable code of conduct for the South China Sea any time soon. As such, the status quo will continue for the foreseeable future. 

Notes:

1. “Why There was no ASEAN Joint Communique,” Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, July 19, 2012 http://www.dfa.gov.ph/main/index.php/newsroom/dfa-releases/5950-why-there-was-no-asean-joint-communique-.
2. Ernest Bower, “China reveals its hand on ASEAN in Phnom Penh,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 20 2012.
3. “Statement of ASEAN Foreign Ministers on ASEAN’s Six-Point Principles on the South China Sea,” Cambodian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 20, 2012 http://www.mfaic.gov.kh/mofa/default.aspx?id=3206.

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