Rightways

Sunday, 2 September 2012

'China-threat theory' dismissed

PHOTO: REUTERS/FILE

COLOMBO: Chinese Defence Minister Liang Guanglie says Beijing's increasingly close ties with South Asia are aimed at ensuring regional "security and stability" and are not intended to harm any "third party".

Liang, the first Chinese defence minister to visit Sri Lanka, did not name India -- where he heads to Sunday -- but officials in New Delhi have expressed concerns about Beijing's influence in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Maldives, Nepal and Pakistan.

India fears it might be part of a Chinese policy to throw a "string of pearls" -- a circle of influence -- around regional rival India.

But in a speech released by Sri Lanka's military on Saturday, Liang said that China had only peaceful intentions in South Asia, while stressing that the Indian Ocean was an important supply route for his fast-developing country.

Beijing is seeking "harmonious co-existence and mutually beneficial and win-win cooperation" with countries in the region, he told a Sri Lankan army staff college on Thursday, according to a copy of the speech.

In New Delhi, the minister will be a guest of the defence ministry, an Indian government spokesman said, without giving details of what will be discussed.

India is warily eyeing growing Chinese clout in what New Delhi regards as its traditional sphere of influence.

Liang dismissed the "China-threat theory".

"Some people in the international community suspect that China would take the road of expansion with force and have been actively spreading the 'China-threat theory'," he said.

"The People's Liberation Army (China's armed forces) efforts in conducting friendly exchanges and cooperation with its counterparts in South Asian are intended for maintaining regional security and stability and not targeted at any third party," he added.

Liang said his trip to Colombo was aimed at further strengthening close ties with Sri Lanka, including military cooperation.

China is a key supplier of weapons to the Sri Lankan military, which in 2009 crushed the Tamil Tiger rebels and declared an end to 37 years of ethnic conflict that claimed up to 100,000 lives on the island, according to UN estimates. – AFP

Respond calmly to 'China threat theory'

China has won acclaims for its significant economic and social achievements since the reform and opening-up, but at the same time it has been seen as a threat by many countries.

Conflict of interest, an underlying cause of "China threat theory"

The "China threat theory" is caused by the country's rapid growth in economic and military strength, and is bound to accompany the country's rise as a great power.

In the eyes of certain Western powers, China's rise poses a challenge to the traditional Western-led international order and geopolitical landscape. According to the history of capitalism's rise, the rise of all great powers was accompanied by the use of force and wars. For example, the rise of the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany, and Japan all followed the same old path of wealth accumulation, military buildup, and military expansion. Western international relations theories formed on this basis, be it the Western power shift theory or hegemony transfer theory, believe that China's rise will cause a shift of power among countries and break the existing international order, which will cause global instability and even wars.

Therefore, the real reason for Western countries to propagate the "China threat theory" is that they are afraid that China will challenge the existing international status when it becomes strong. The western countries hope to restrict the rise of China by means of the "China threat theory."

"China threat theory" has dual effect of containment and stimulation

In order to curb and interfere with China's development, the Western countries hype the new round of "China threat theory." However, the result is counterproductive. The "China threat theory" exaggerated by the Western countries for decades produced a dual effect of containment and stimulation.

On one hand, the "China threat theory" damaged the image of China and deterred the development pace of China. It deteriorated the surrounding environment of China to some extent and made China must face a more complex international environment and withstand more external pressure.

On the other hand, as an imposed power, the "China threat theory" strengthened China's sense of crisis and stimulated the rise and development of China. According to the "challenge-response" theory of British historian Arnold J. Toynbee, the organism will instinctively produce a series of effective responses in the face of challenges and ultimately promote its development.

Take a calm and initiative attitude in response to "China threat theory"

The "China threat theory" has become a preferred tool in the domestic politics of some countries, and has become a power discourse in the international community. Whenever some countries suffer from relevant domestic political issues, they often take the "China threat theory" as shields. For example, in the currently heated U.S. presidential election, the "China threat theory" is the stock in trade of the Obama administration. Facing the "China threat theory," we have to be calm and initiative, but also take the following effective methods.

Firstly, have a calm state of mind compatible with other dominant countries. Secondly, continue to promote and intensify international cooperation. Thirdly, actively build a favorable national image. Fourthly, unswervingly follow the road of peaceful development.

Therefore, the fundamental way to offset the negative effects of "China threat theory" is to vigorously develop China's national strength. Besides, we should concentrate on our own business so as to ride out the current critical period of development. By then, the "China threat theory" as a special historical symbol in China's development process will naturally fade.

Read the Chinese version at http://zqb.cyol.com/html/2012-04/06/nw.D110000zgqnb_20120406_1-09.htm

By Shi Qingren (China Youth Daily)

'China-threat theory' dismissed

PHOTO: REUTERS/FILE

Respond calmly to 'China threat theory'

By Shi Qingren (China Youth Daily)

'China-threat theory' dismissed

PHOTO: REUTERS/FILE

Respond calmly to 'China threat theory'

By Shi Qingren (China Youth Daily)

Pitching for the Asean 10

Asean countries are still developing because there is still much to do, and much to learn about how to do it.

IF Asean is sometimes accused of being a talking shop, it also vividly demonstrates the value and virtues of some talking shops.

Officials’ meetings at various levels are legion, growing in number and scope over half a century until they average a few a day for every day of the year.

Between these are the summits, being more prominent in comprising heads of governments. Besides the content of the proceedings, the frequency of the summits themselves may indicate the state of the South-East Asian region.

When leaders from Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand met in Bangkok in 1967 to found Asean, that was somehow not considered a summit. So the “first” summit came only in 1976 in Bali, with the “Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia” and the “Declaration of Asean Concord.”

The second summit came the following year in Kuala Lumpur, coinciding with an Asean-Japan dialogue. Although this was only one year after the first, it was a whole decade after Asean’s founding and would be another full decade before the next.

The third summit (Manila, 1987) decided to hold summits every five years. By the seventh (Bandar Seri Begawan) it would be every year, then after skipping 2006 the Philippines hosted the 12th in Cebu amid local protests.

The 14th summit slated for 2008 in Thailand was postponed to early 2009 over domestic disturbances, then put off for another two months in the broken Pattaya gathering. From then on, summits would be biannual affairs.

Between and beyond the summits, whether or not local scandals and protests add to the news value of Asean gatherings, the original five member nations seem to attract more attention if not also more interest. This is anomalous since Asean membership confers equal status on all members regardless of size, age, clout or political system.

The newer members can actually be quite pivotal in their own way, as Vietnam and then Cambodia had been, and as Myanmar may be now. And several of the older members need not be particularly significant to the Asean 10 as a whole, much less beyond.

With such issues in mind, Malaysia’s Foreign Policy Studies Group last week held another roundtable conference in Kuala Lumpur on how relations between Malaysia and the CLM countries (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar) can contribute to Asean consolidation.

An earlier roundtable comprised delegates from Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam in assessing how their countries’ relations with Malaysia could progress in the same vein. Vietnam, as the largest and most developed of Asean’s newer CLMV members, had also introduced reforms earliest to qualify to join the earlier dialogue with some of the original members.

Other CLMV countries have progressed on other fronts on their own. It is now 20 years since Cambodia, for example, reached agreement with Malaysia on visa-free travel.

Laos is another country that Malaysia has assisted, with the establishment of bilateral relations (in 1966) even before Asean was founded. Since then, relations have flourished, particularly after Malaysia worked to welcome Vientiane into Asean.

Myanmar today is still undergoing a transition, and therefore also very much a focus of world media attention. Its people now have a greater sense of nationhood following a raft of reforms, mindful of the national interest from economic priorities to the prerogative of rejecting foreign military bases on its soil.

A Malaysian delegate said that the US, following news reports last Sunday, was now looking for a suitable site for a new “missile shield” system in the region. The US and China were the two proverbial “elephants in the room”, and the geopolitical rivalry between them very much an issue for all delegates.

No individual, organisation or country at the roundtable, whether officially or unofficially, was left undisturbed by major power rivalry contaminating the Asean region. This was the more so when preparations abroad tended to centre around a military build-up, with the US “pivot to Asia” involving stationing 60% of its military assets in the Asia-Pacific.

According to one recent analysis, at current and anticipated rates China’s economy could surpass the US’ as early as 2016, and US overall decline could become evident by 2020. Ironically, as with its former Soviet adversary before it, the decline would be underscored by excessive military expenditure and a warlike mindset.

Given these scenarios, it is important to be reminded of some pertinent underlying issues. These may be framed by some telling questions that must be asked, for which answers are vitally needed.

First, are the CLM countries necessarily more dependent on a regional superpower-as-benefactor like China economically, compared to Asean’s older and more developed members. Not so, especially when considering that the latter, with larger economies, have more at stake in dealing with a rising China.

Second, is China even likely to consider challenging US dominance in the region? Despite occasionally dire pronouncements by some there is no evidence of that, indeed quite the reverse: beyond assertions of its old maritime claims, Beijing’s relations with all countries in the region have been progressing and progressive.

US military dominance in the Asia-Pacific is often credited with keeping the regional peace, particularly in the high seas. Is this assumption merited if piracy and terrorism are not included in the calculus, since there may not be any other military force out to wreak havoc in the region post-1945?

Fourth, how much value is there still in the assumption that the US military posture is and will remain the status quo entity in the region? The status quo is helping China’s economy grow, with secure shipping and harmonious development, while the US economy is continually taxed by its large and growing military presence.

Fifth, and by extension, how much pulling power is there today in US efforts at soliciting allies? The problem with enlisting in an alliance for other countries is that to be identified as an ally of a major power is also to identify as an ally against another major power.

Dividing the region in Cold War fashion does not help anyone, and never did. To enlist with a (relatively) declining superpower creates further problems of its own for such allies.

Sixth, can China’s reported flexing of its muscles in the South China Sea and the East China Sea in any way be a show of strength? Since it only gives Beijing a negative image just as it needs to look good, without any gain in return, it is instead a point of weakness.

Seventh, can US efforts to contain China ever work? There is no shortage of instances that verify containment, a situation confirmed by official denials.

So, eighth, why try to contain China at all when in the process the US only loses goodwill before losing face? Perhaps old habits die hard, but more likely the military-industrial complex dies harder.

Smaller countries in Asean and elsewhere have much to learn from the major powers, notably the US and China. Sadly, the lessons are just as much what not to do as they are about what to do.